One of the key lessons learnt from the Doklam incident that occurred between India and China in July-August 2017 was that both sides did what they had to in order to safeguard their interests. While China was trying to penetrate deeper into Bhutanese territory with the clear aim of threatening India’s Siliguri Corridor, India was merely ensuring that the tri-junction at Batang La was not shifted further south to Doka La. 

China, of course, used the Doklam incident and subsequent events to signal to Bhutan that it could not do much on the boundary question bilaterally. The aftermath of the Doklam incident signals that China is also telling Bhutan that India cannot help Bhutan in a real sense. This message becomes clear when one reads the latest Report of the Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs submitted to the government. Briefing the Committee, the then Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar informed:

“The face off itself ended on August 28, 2017…..concerns that led to the face off situation emanated from Chinese actions to change the status-quo on the ground by seeking to build a road in southern Doklam in violation of their existing understandings with both India and Bhutan. This had implications for the determination of the tri-junction point between India, China and Bhutan and the alignment of the India-China boundary in the Sikkim sector. Where Bhutan was concerned, it was in violation of agreements in 1988 and 1998 not to change the status-quo while boundary negotiations were still in progress.”

The position taken by India and articulated in the Report of the Standing Committee is that there is no change in the status quo on the face-off site (at Doka La) and that reports (October 2017) of a military build up on the Doklam Plataeau actually signalled movement within Chinese territory and not in Bhutan. The point of the matter is that while Doklam is disputed between China and Bhutan, but for India “the limited objective of the action taken by the Indian side was to stop the road construction in close proximity of India-Bhutan border which would have prejudiced the determination of the tri-junction point and which had security implications for India.” The point of note is that the face-off between India and China was actually at Doka La, south of Batang La and not the Doklam Plateau, further north and with Chumbi Valley to its West!

The Standing Committee has expressed its concern over the Chinese build up in North Doklam, which according to the Indian government is Chinese territory and therefore did not immediately raise the alarm bells. The Committee has rightly concluded that “while dealing with China, it is always better to have a sense of ‘healthy scepticism’. Even if they have withdrawn their troops from Doklam for the time being, China’s strategic intentions should not be taken casually”.

In October 2017, news reports claimed that China had brought in more troops into an area north of Yadong town. This is in the region of the Doklam plateau which is north of the tri-junction at Batang La and is a disputed site between China and Bhutan. Therefore, the Chinese are doing two things. First they are not doing anything on the face off site. Instead, they are constructing an alternative route to Zompheri Ridge by going around the other way. True, this is a difficult task in varied terrain, but it is being done. 

The other thing China has done is to strengthen its military hold over the Chumbi Valley. China has strengthened itself where it was weak and is therefore in a position to respond to any India riposte from the Indian State of Sikkim. But strategically and diplomatically, the far more important thing that has happened is that China is now turning the screws on Bhutan with little care for the latter’s sovereignty and building roads and infrastructure with a view to threatening India’s Siliguri Corridor. 

This in effect means that China is preparing for another push towards Zompheri Ridge, but this time from the other side of Torsa Nala! This also would take place well within Bhutanese territory, but there is nothing that India can do! That is precisely why India needs to reassess the entire gamut of Chinese actions in the Chumbi Valley and Doklam, before strategizing for the next round of confrontation with China. China has for decades now, been quietly building roads in disputed areas in Bhutan. While Bhutan in the past did make a song and dance about it, it was with the limited objective of using it as a discussion point in boundary negotiations with China. 

Today, there is little that Bhutan can do in the face of Chinese aggression that cuts across Bhutanese territory like a knife right up to India’s borders. This cartographic aggression is likely to lead to more tensions between India and China.  In fact, as the Standing Committee records, China and Bhutan have held 24 rounds of negotiations on the boundary issue and China has been telling Bhutan to barter away Doklam in exchange for territory in the north. All this while, the Chinese in the meantime have been quietly engaging in land grabbing and stabbing Bhutan in the back. Therefore, the world needs to look at this new form of perfidy by the Chinese.