Pakistan is set to go for elections on July 25. Various surveys have predicted a hung National Assembly with the Pakistan Muslim League led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) ahead of all other political parties in terms of the overall popular support across the country, followed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) headed by the former cricket icon, Imran Khan. While mainstream national parties, the PML-N, PTI and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) are slugging it out, there is an interesting but ominous melange of the extremist political parties, all of which have entered the electoral fray with behind the curtains political and electoral engineering by the Pakistan Army. These extremist outfits, so far known for their anti-minorities, anti-India and anti-Afghanistan hate mongering, have sensed an opportunity with systematic erosion in the credibility of the PML-N and PPP, due to corruption scandals and nepotism. This was evident in the verdict of Pakistan’s anti-corruption agency, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) on July 6 against the Nawaz Sharif, which has set the tone for the political alignments by boosting PTI’s fortunes along with that of other extremist political parties.


 


As per the latest data from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), these extremist parties have in total fielded 460 candidates for the National Assembly (NA) seats. Ironically, all this is happening just as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global watchdog on terrorist financing and money laundering, has placed Pakistan on its ‘Grey List’ for its alleged failure to address terror financing and money laundering in the country.


 


The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and its chief, Hafiz Saeed, never one to miss an opportunity, was the first to one to jump in the fray by setting up the Milli Muslim League (MML), last year in August. Since then MML’s registration as a political party has twice been rejected by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). Yet that has not stopped the MML from contesting the elections. Repudiating the courts and the ECP, the MML has put up around 260 candidates- 79 for the NA, under the banner of an obscure party, the Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek (AAT), which is already registered with the ECP.


 


While Hafiz Saeed is not contesting the elections, his transformation as a politician is complete. Among the MML’s major candidates are Hafiz Talha Saeed, Hafiz Saeed’s son, contesting from the Sargodha NA seat in Punjab province. The Treasury Department of the United States had already described Talha Saeed as in-charge of LeT’s propaganda department and also responsible for recruitment. Another prominent candidate is his brother-in-law, Khalid Waleed, who is contesting from Sheikhupura Provincial Assembly (PA) seat, also in the province of Punjab. As per the US Treasury, Waleed has been associated with the LeT since at least 2006, in-charge of various responsibilities.


 


MML’s ability to find loopholes in the system by fielding known terrorist operatives, has reinforced the often-held argument that Pakistani authorities are unwilling to curb or are overlooking the extremist and militant groups’ activities.  


 


Another relative newcomer which has garnered much of the attention and space is the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), part of the Tehreek Labaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLY), led by Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi. For the uninitiated, TLY had shot to quick prominence with its anti-Blasphemy ‘sit-in’ protests last year in November, demanding the resignation of the Law Minister Zahid Hamid and strict action against those behind the amendment to the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (Finality of the Prophet Muhammad) oath in the Elections Act 2017. The TLY had been successful in its demands, because of the kid gloves treatment from the Pakistan Army, in its tacit attempt to undermine the credibility of civilian institutions.


 


The TLP is banking on these successful protests to make a mark in the national polity - the strategy being to smartly utilise the religious sentiments of the voters and promising to use Islam’s teachings to create an Islamic welfare state in Pakistan. The party has fielded 187 candidates and Khadim Hussain Rizvi has already expressed confidence to bring “surprising results.” Accompanying this is the social media blitzkrieg, which has portrayed Rizvi as a moderate face to make him widely acceptable. TLP’s campaign propaganda has used slogans such as “Say No to liberalism and vote for Islam”. It has used themes such as recalling Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s legacy, demanding release of convicted Pakistani terrorist, Aafia Siddiqui, and projecting Rizvi as the so-called protector of a country ‘badly attacked by Ahmadis and corrupt political mafia’.


 


Both the parties’ social media campaign has made hashtags viral such as #VoteForChairToMakeSocietyFair (reference to AAT’s election symbol) and #KhiRizviKa (TLP’s election rally in Karachi). A critical part of TLP’s social media campaign is an attempt by Rizvi’s supporters to project popular show of support in its rallies such as in Karachi - once the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) stronghold, Punjab province and other parts of Pakistan.


 


Both MMA and TLP are threatening the voter base of the older ultra-conservative Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a grouping of religious parties, which had captured significant seats in 2002 elections. The MMA had been revived last year and now five religious parties including the Jamaat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUI) led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (JIP), Jamaat Ulema-i-Pakistan led by Noorani, Jamaat Ahle Hadith Pakistan (Sajid Mir group) and Tehreek-i-Islami are contesting elections from the MMA’s platform.


 


As per the MMA leader Fazlur Rahman, the alliance’s manifesto includes implementation of Nizam-e-Mustafa, safeguarding all Islamic provisions in the Constitution of Pakistan, an empowered parliament, ensuring free and fair judiciary and devolution of power. It has also sought mobilisation against India accusing the country of building dams to disrupt water supplies to Pakistan. The MMA has fielded 630 candidates for the NA and PA seats. The alliance too enjoys the Army’s patronage. In 2002, it was widely believed that, unlike PPP and PML(N), MMA was allowed to campaign freely, and choose its candidates unhindered, by the military government that was overseeing the election.


 


All of these parties, who vow to safeguard Islam, have entered the electoral arena this year seeking to benefit from the discrediting of the PML(N) and PPP, with adequate propping up by Pakistan’s military leadership and the timely lifting of the ban on a rabid anti-Shia outfit Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), the successor of the proscribed organisation Sipah e Sahiba Pakistan (SSP). ASWJ’s sealed assets have been unfrozen and its chief Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi has been taken off the Fourth Schedule (a provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 of Pakistan related to involvement in terrorist activities). The ASWJ has been behind much of the sectarian violence in Pakistan. Pertinently, its president Allama Aurangzeb Farooqi is already set to contest elections from the Malir NA seat in the province of Sindh, under the banner of the Pak Rah-e-Haq Party. As against this, smaller parties in provinces like Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, which seek to give voice to the religious and ethnic minorities, have faced discrimination and harassment by the security establishment. The killing of a renowned Awami National Party (ANP) leader Haroon Bilour for which the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) has claimed the responsibility, is a  grim reminder that despite Pakistan Army’s toll claim that no organised terror network does exist on Pakistan’s soil, is indeed vacuous.       


 


Pakistan’s 2018 elections are an important milestone in the mainstreaming of the extremist and terrorist outfits- a project fully supported by the Pakistani Army. While it remains a guess on how many seats these parties are able to garner, given the predictions of a hung NA, their role will be critical in the next government formation. This potentially gives them an opportunity to bring their rabidly conservative, vitriolic and sectarian agenda into the domains of policy making. This has serious implications for Pakistan’s foreign policy and regional security.